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ABSTRACT
Robert Nozick’s oft-quoted review of Tom Regan’s The Case for 
Animal Rights levels a range of challenges to Regan’s philosophy. 
Many commentators have focused on Nozick’s putative defense of 
speciesism, but this has led to them overlooking other aspects of the 
critique. In this paper, I draw attention to two. First is Nozick’s criti-
cism of Regan’s political theory, which is best understood relative 
to Nozick’s libertarianism. Nozick’s challenge invites the possibility 
of a libertarian account of animal rights – which is not as oxymo-
ronic as it may first sound. Second is Nozick’s criticism of Regan’s 
axiological theory, which is best understood relative to Nozick’s own 
axiological inegalitarianism. While Nozick’s axiology has distaste-
ful consequences, it should not be dismissed out-of-hand. Nozick’s 
challenges to Regan – and Nozick’s wider animal ethics – are rich 
and original, warranting attention from contemporary theorists for 
reasons beyond mere historical interest.
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Tom Regan published The Case for Animal Rights (hereaf-
ter, The Case) in 1983, spawning a literature of responses, cri-
tiques, developments and applications. It continues to have con-
siderable influence on philosophical literature in animal ethics 
to this day – as this special issue demonstrates. Regan belongs 
on a short list of the most influential and significant normative 
philosophers of the 21st century. Another philosopher who un-
doubtedly belongs on this list is Robert Nozick, most famous 
as the author of the 1974 Anarchy, State, and Utopia (hereafter, 
ASU), in which he offers a right libertarian theory of justice. 
In this paper, I draw attention to Nozick’s comments on Regan, 
interrogating the relationship between the two thinkers.
Right libertarianism is rarely thought of as a natural friend 
to animal ethics, with spirited critiques of animal rights – in-
cluding Regan’s philosophy in particular – and veganism com-
ing from a range of libertarian theorists (e.g., Englehardt 2001; 
Lomasky 2013; Machan 2004; Narveson 1977; Narveson 1987). 
In the words of Jeremy R. Garrett,
not only have there been no libertarian defenses of ani-
mal rights … [but] most libertarians follow the lead of 
Tibor Machan, Jan Narveson, and H. Tristram Engl-
hardt in explicitly rejecting animal rights. Moreover, 
many libertarians seem to view their rejection of ani-
mal rights as directly entailed by their libertarianism. 
(Garrett 2016, 15)
It thus may not be surprising that Nozick offered a critique 
of The Case. His review was published in the New York Times 
Book Review as “About Mammals and People” (1983), and 
Nozick later anthologized it – demonstrating that he thought 
the comments worthy of note – in his Socratic Puzzles as 
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“Do Animals Have Rights?” (1997, chap. 18). Regan (n.d., 19) 
speaks of the significance of both the review and a meeting 
with Nozick, and approvingly cites Nozick’s comments in de-
fense of animals (e.g., Regan 2001, 130-1) and on rights theory 
(e.g., Regan 2004b, 15-6). Despite this, to my knowledge, he 
never engaged with Nozick’s review directly.
It is my contention that Nozick’s comments warrant at-
tention for several reasons. Most trivially, there is something 
historically interesting about the review. The fact that these 
comments indicate what Nozick thought about The Case make 
them worth reading. More importantly, these comments offer a 
critique of Regan’s project worth taking seriously. To be clear, I 
am not talking about Nozick’s arguments putatively in defense 
of speciesism (Nozick 1997, 307-9), upon which others have 
commented. Instead, I am talking about Nozick’s (underdevel-
oped, in the review) challenge to Regan’s position of species 
equality, and his challenge to Regan’s politics (Nozick 1997, 
309-10). In challenging Regan’s politics, Nozick is ahead of his 
time. Today, in the midst of the “political turn” in animal eth-
ics, we are in a good position to explore the politics of The Case 
(see Cochrane, Garner and O’Sullivan, 2018), and we could do 
worse than start with Nozick’s comments.
There is a third reason that Nozick’s comments are worth 
exploring. Nozick is explicitly not condemning Regan for look-
ing to the question of what is owed to animals, and specifically 
does not deny that we might owe animals a great deal (though 
he does claim that Regan takes his argument too far). This 
points towards the chance to develop a Nozickian or otherwise 
libertarian perspective on animals, potentially valuable for ex-
panding an overlapping consensus in favor of animal rights, 
and in its own right – it could be that adding a Nozickian spin 
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to The Case will serve to strengthen it. At the very least, this is 
a possibility we should be willing to explore.
This paper will advance as follows. First, I will briefly set 
out the elements of Nozick’s challenge to Regan on which I 
will not be focusing. I will then expand upon Nozick’s political 
challenge to Regan, arguing that his critique should be seen 
in context as recognizably libertarian. I will then argue that 
The Case could be given a libertarian edge, and that a libertar-
ian animal rights can avoid the political criticisms that Nozick 
levels. Subsequently, I will move on to the criticism offered 
to Regan’s egalitarianism. Rather than draw upon Nozick’s 
arguments putatively in favor of speciesism, however, I will 
show that wider Nozickian philosophy offers the resources for 
an inegalitarian but non-speciesist axiology. Nozick can and 
does offer sophisticated and worthwhile thoughts on the value 
of animals, and these are views that may be of benefit to con-
temporary animal ethicists.
Nozick’s first critiques
“Animal rights,” Nozick tells us, “seems a topic for cranks,” 
with “crankiness” characterized relative to its “disproportion-
ateness” (1997, 205). Perhaps there is an irony here; Nozick, it 
has been suggested, disproportionately agonizes over appar-
ently minor issues in his ASU – indeed, multiple critics (see 
Singer 1976, 192) have criticized him for spending too much 
time exploring ethico-political questions about animals. None-
theless, Regan does not, “to [Nozick’s] knowledge, fit the mold 
of a crank” (1997, 206; cf. McMahan 2016), and Nozick claims 
that The Case is “lucid, closely reasoned and dispassionate” 
(1997, 206), before exploring a number of challenges to Re-
gan’s project.
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Nozick’s first attack is on Regan’s attribution of the mental 
characteristics associated with being a subject-of-a-life – be-
ings, for Regan, who possess “inherent value” and are thus 
owed respect – to animals (cf. Regan 2004a, 243). The behav-
iors of animals, Nozick suggests, “might be explained without 
such heavy cognitive apparatus” (1997, 306). Such a critique is 
not compelling (Garrett 2016, 28-9). However, Nozick also ar-
gues that even if year-old mammals – Regan’s favored example 
of subjects-of-a-life – are as psychologically complex as Regan 
argues, “their beliefs, desires, intentions, future orientations, 
etc., surely are far more rudimentary than those of most hu-
mans, and this may make much moral difference” (1997, 306-
7). I will return to this claim below.
Nozick then moves on to the argument from species over-
lap. I note that there are good reasons to favor this name over 
the more common “argument from marginal cases” (see Horta 
2014), a name that was, incidentally, coined by a libertarian 
critic of animal rights in a review of Regan’s work (Narveson 
1977). It is this discussion that has led to Nozick’s review be-
ing commented upon by animal ethicists; for example, Daniel 
Dombrowski offers a chapter of his Babies and Beasts to “The 
Nozick-Rachels Debate” (Dombrowski 1997, chap. 6; cf. Rach-
els 1990). Nozick tries out several arguments for speciesism, 
but, by his own admission, they are weak. It is regrettable that 
he chose to focus much of his review on Regan’s moral indi-
vidualism, but this should not lead us to neglect his more inter-
esting arguments. Given that the former arguments have been 
explored elsewhere, I will offer only a brief recapitulation here.
Nozick is concerned that any argument for animal rights re-
lying on the equation of animals and non-paradigmatic humans 
is more likely to result in the disvaluing of humans than the 
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lionization of animals (1997, 307).  He is skeptical of the claim 
that the burden of proof lies with the speciesist, suggesting that 
as “no one has spent much time trying to formulate” a “theory 
of the moral importance of species membership,” little should 
be inferred from our lack of one (1997, 308). This argument 
takes on the opposite significance today: “the fact that no one 
has come up with a really convincing reason […] strongly sug-
gests that there is no such reason” (Lazari-Radek and Singer 
2014, 343). Nozick, however, does attempt to formulate a the-
ory, speculating that there is perhaps a “general principle that 
the members of any species may legitimately give their fellows 
… more weight than a neutral view would grant them” (1997, 
308). The argument upon which he rests is that “we see hu-
mans, even defective [sic] ones, as part of the multifarious tex-
ture of human history and civilizations, human achievements, 
and human family relations,” while animals are seen as part of 
“a different background texture” (1997, 308). It is “the total dif-
ferences between two rich tapestries” that makes the moral dif-
ference (1997, 309). Nozick has “worries in presenting this type 
of position, for scoundrels too may seek refuge from criticism 
in the reply that some differences are too great and complicated 
to state” (1997, 309). His curiously non-normative conclusion 
is that until philosophers “can morally assess the differences 
between such total contexts […] their conclusions, especially 
when startling, will not be taken seriously” (1997, 309).
Nozick’s political critique 
I will say no more about Nozick and species membership, 
and will instead look to the closing paragraphs of Nozick’s 
review. Implicitly drawing upon his own conception of rights 
as valid claims warranting protection from the state, Nozick 
observes that Regan’s account entails that “the force of law 
should be brought to bear” on those who would violate the 
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rights of animals (1997, 209). The Case, for Nozick, is thus a 
work of political philosophy. This should not be surprising. 
“Political philosophy,” Nozick elsewhere explains, “is mainly 
the theory of what behavior legitimately may be enforced, and 
of the nature of the institutional structure that stays within and 
supports these enforceable rights” (1981, 503). Rights are thus 
central in political philosophy, even if not in moral philosophy, 
because “the state is demarcated as the organ monopolizing 
the (legitimate) use of force” (1981, 503). For Nozick, rights are 
enforceable, and this separates them from other kinds of ethi-
cal demand; this is an important, distinctive feature of Nozick’s 
libertarianism (Garrett 2016, 16; Nozick 1981, 499, 503; Vallen-
tyne 2011, 147; Wolff 2003, 22).
Nozick is not enamored of Regan’s politics. Regan’s position 
that animals have rights “goes too far” (Nozick 1997, 309), but 
Nozick is more interested in speculating where thinkers will 
go after Regan:
If once it is granted [that subjects-of-a-life] possess 
rights and have a welfare they can experience, we can 
imagine more extreme proponents calling for welfare 
payments for [subjects-of-a-life], nonvoting citizenship 
for them, and interspecies marriage rights. I think Mr. 
Regan himself would regard these proposals as going 
too far, indeed as cranky. (1997, 309)
It is telling that the possibility of welfare support for animals 
and nonvoting citizenship rights have been key talking points 
in the political turn (see Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; Garner 
and O’Sullivan 2016). Sue Donaldson (2017) even explores the 
possibility of voting citizenship for animals, meaning that she 
has taken the political inclusion of animals further than Nozick 
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imagined anyone would. Interspecies marriage rights have 
been less of a part of the political turn, but Peter Singer, among 
others, defends certain instances of bestiality as non-harmful 
sexual contact (Singer 2001; Singer 2016); calls for interspecies 
marriage rights may not be far behind.
The critique is thus that 1) political protection of animals 
forces the state to overstep its bounds and that 2) opening the 
door to political protection of animals risks the institution of 
strong positive rights for animals. It is useful to recognize that 
these critiques are coming from a libertarian. While it was 
once common to claim that Nozick abandoned libertarianism 
after the publication of ASU, he defends libertarianism in later 
work (Nozick 2001), and declares himself libertarian in his last 
interview (Sanchez 2001). This is not to say that his politics did 
not develop (see Nozick 1993, chaps. I-III; Nozick 2006, chap. 
25) – merely that it remained broadly libertarian.
When considered thus, Nozick’s worries about Reganite 
politics take on a new character. It is hardly surprising that 
a libertarian will be worried about the state overstepping its 
bounds, and especially about the extension of positive rights 
and state interference in private relationships. Indeed, even the 
concept of “citizenship” is one about which minarchists will be 
suspicious. Unsurprisingly, Nozick is not the only libertarian 
who expresses concerns about animal rights and large states: 
Machan, for instance, argues that “[t]hose who genuinely care 
for animals should consider the possibility that to the extent 
arguments for animal rights succeed, they may only confer ad-
ditional power on government and bureaucrats to run our lives 
for us” (2004, 23).
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Nozicking Regan
We can overcome this aspect of Nozick’s critique of Regan 
by explicitly limiting the kinds of rights possessed by animals. 
The content of Regan’s rights is hazy; while it is sometimes 
assumed that Regan is talking about negative rights possessed 
by animals – rights against being killed, imprisoned, tortured – 
we can also see that he is, in certain circumstances, concerned 
with positive rights, including rights to assistance. It is thus 
far from clear that Nozick is right to say that Regan would op-
pose the developments he envisages; to draw upon Reganite 
language, it could be that “respecting” the “inherent value” of 
subjects-of-a-life requires offering them state support. Regan’s 
reluctance to explore the positive/negative rights divide – and 
Nozick’s assumption that Regan is talking only about negative 
rights – is reflective of the traditional assumption that animals’ 
rights are wholly negative, something challenged in the politi-
cal turn (see Milligan 2015). 
We could sidestep this aspect of Nozick’s critique by giv-
ing animal rights an explicitly libertarian edge. This should be 
of interest to anyone who finds Nozick’s critique of The Case 
compelling, and anyone who is worried about the discussions 
about positive rights in the political turn – not just libertar-
ians. “Nozicking” Regan would entail affirming that the rights 
of animals are negative, and denying that animals have rights 
to the kind of positive entitlements about which Nozick – and 
other libertarians – are worried (cf. Ebert and Machan 2012; 
Graham 2004). This may not be all that a libertarian animal 
ethics would say; there are opportunities to sympathetically ex-
plore the application of libertarian principles to animals (e.g., 
Hadley 2015b, chap. 3; Hadley 2017; Milburn 2016; Milburn 
2017a), but this is to jump ahead. There is first the more funda-
mental question concerning the compatibility of libertarianism 
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with animal rights, as defended in recent work (Garrett 2016; 
Milburn 2017b). The exploration of this question is crucial not 
just for making sense of an animal rights account affirming 
negative-but-not-positive rights but for answering the other 
part of Nozick’s political critique – the worry that defense of 
animal rights overextends the state.
Garrett (2016) establishes the premise of deontological lib-
ertarianism – the moral theory undergirding Nozick’s political 
theory – as the existence of rights that
1) function as independently valid and morally en-
forceable “side-constraints” that limit the initiation 
of non-consensual force against others; 2) reflect the 
“separateness” and “inviolability” of individuals; and 
3) entail, as their most fundamental and incomparable 
implication, very strong protections against actions 
that threaten the life, liberty, and bodily integrity of 
the rights bearers. (Garrett 2016, 19, quoting Nozick 
1974, passim)
This might also serve as an incomplete description of Re-
gan’s account of rights (Garrett 2016, 19). If the Nozickian 
wishes to challenge the claim that animals are right bearers, 
she needs to challenge either Regan’s normative premise that 
subjects-of-a-life possess inherent value (in Regan’s sense: be-
ings with inherent value are owed respect, and, thus, rights), or 
his empirical premise that animals are subjects-of-a-life. Gar-
rett spends much of his paper responding to what he reads as 
Nozick’s attempts to do this – namely, the already-mentioned 
challenge to Regan’s claims about animal cognition and appeal 
to the richness of context – concluding that Nozick’s arguments 
fail (Garrett 2016, 20-32). Thus, not only are there good reasons 
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for libertarians to accept animal rights, and no good reasons for 
libertarians to reject animal rights, but libertarians should take 
a cautious approach, and extend rights to animals even if un-
certainty about their moral status remains. If they seek an ex-
isting theory of animal rights for this purpose, Regan’s account 
fits their commitments well (Garrett 2016, 32-3). Ultimately,
even if they are initially uncomfortable with Regan’s 
claim that animals have equal inherent value with 
humans, libertarians should not be at all comfortable 
with defending, let alone celebrating, the kind of non-
consensual aggression they abhor when it is directed 
toward animals. Rather, given their overriding com-
mitment to core negative rights and the fact that adult 
mammals may well have the kinds of mental and emo-
tional lives that make these rights applicable, libertar-
ians should be extremely hesitant to endorse viola-
tions of their lives, liberty, and bodily integrity (i.e., 
the rights central both to libertarians and to Regan’s 
theory). (Garrett 2016, 33)
Independently of Garrett, I have argued (2017b) that Nozick 
is a latent animal rightist. Nozick was a vegetarian (Nozick 
1981, 523), arguing at length in ASU that all Americans should 
be, too (1974, 35-9). It is in this discussion that Nozick intro-
duces his oft-quoted but “too minimal” suggestion of “utilitari-
anism for animals, Kantianism for people” (1974, 39), but this 
is not his all-things-considered view (Milburn 2017b). Nozick’s 
comments on animals are often explicitly overlooked by his 
interpreters (e.g., Bader 2010, 13; Lacey 2001, 28; Wolff 2003, 
2-3), and puzzle those who do look to them (e.g., Vallentyne 
2011; cf. Garrett 2016, note 17). 
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I argue that there are a range of ways to incorporate animals 
firmly into Nozickian normative philosophy (2017b). One area 
to explore concerns the place of animals in Nozick’s moral phi-
losophy. This includes the place that animals (explicitly and 
implicitly) have in Nozick’s four levels of ethics (Nozick 2001, 
260-2; Nozick 2006, 212-4), the value of animals in Nozick’s 
axiology – discussed below – and the place that animals should 
have in a meaningful life: indeed, Nozick seems to be commit-
ted (whether he realizes it or not) to the claim that the life of a 
vegan is, all else equal, more meaningful than the life of a non-
vegan (Milburn 2017b, 115).
However, the relegation of animals from the realm of politics 
to the realm of the “merely” moral is insufficient, and I have 
offered two ways that Nozick could ground animal rights in his 
libertarianism (Milburn 2017b). One takes as given Nozick’s 
grounding of rights in the meaning of life. Garrett acknowl-
edges this as a strategy Nozick uses to exclude animals from 
the domain of rights bearers (2016, 21-2), but engages only with 
ASU, and neither Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations (1981) 
nor his The Examined Life (2006), where meaningfulness is 
discussed at length. It could be the case, I argue (2017b, 103-6), 
that rights are grounded in the meaning of life, but that animals 
too have potentially meaningful lives, and thus that they too 
are entitled to rights protection. For Nozick, one’s life is made 
meaningful by the voluntary creation of appropriate connec-
tions to valuable entities beyond oneself (Nozick 1981, 594-5; 
Nozick 2006, 166). This means that Nozick sees meaning and 
value as close, and that a meaningful life is one that voluntarily 
and appropriately exercises the kinds of traits that Regan lauds 
in subjects-of-a-life: the initiation of action; memory; emotion; 
and so forth. Thus, Nozickian animal rights may not be far 
from Reganite animal rights.
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An alternative route would ground animals’ rights in their 
interests, offering Nozick a way to offer protection to those 
animals (human and otherwise) who do not meet the high bar 
the meaning-of-life account is generally assumed to set (Mil-
burn 2017b, 106-11). This would move away from a Reganite 
picture in which rights are grounded in value, and towards ac-
counts of interest-based animal rights, which are prominent in 
the political turn (Milligan 2015). Nozick, though his rights are 
will rights (for reasons justified in his grounding of rights in the 
meaning of life; compare Milburn 2017b, 104), never offers an 
argument against the existence of interest rights (Vallentyne 
2011, 149). Their existence is something he has good reasons 
to embrace. Such an embrace would allow him to protect those 
beings who are not granted will rights, which he clearly wants 
to do (Milburn 2017b, 110).
Thus, we can see that there are a range of ways to talk about 
the possibility of libertarian animal rights grounded in Nozick-
ian philosophy. This is important for several reasons: his-
torical/theoretical interest; convincing libertarians of animal 
rights; and especially to overcome Nozick’s political critiques 
of Regan. A libertarian conception of animal rights can both 
demonstrate that the state is not stepping beyond its proper role 
by protecting animals, and can offer a guard against animal 
rights accounts going further than (Nozick assumes) Regan 
wishes to take them. Insofar as one is worried about the pros-
pect of “welfare payments for year-old mammals, nonvoting 
citizenship for them, and interspecies marriage rights” (Nozick 
1997, 309), one has a good reason to seriously consider a more 
libertarian animal rights. This is not to say that one should be 
worried about these things. My point is that many (even com-
mitted animal rightists) who are not libertarians may be, and 
thus could fruitfully explore Nozicking Regan.
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Nozick’s axiological critique
A second overlooked strand of Nozick’s challenge concerns 
axiology. Nozick praises Regan’s “illuminating discussion of 
the nature of inherent value” (1997, 310), and this is unsur-
prising; when it comes to the exploration of value, Regan and 
Nozick are engaging in a similar enterprise. One crucial dis-
tinction between the two is the relationship posited between 
inherent value and rights possession. Nozick’s axiology is rela-
tively independent of his account of moral status (here under-
stood to mean “account of beings possessing rights”), while 
Regan rests his account of moral status upon axiology: sub-
jects-of-a-life possess inherent value, and are therefore owed 
respect, and are therefore entitled to rights. Regan’s accounts 
of inherent value and moral status are (presented as) categori-
cal. Animal ethicists could side with Nozick in this divide by 
severing the close link between inherent value and moral status 
(indeed, this is what many in the political turn do), but this is 
not what Nozick pushes towards in his review, and so it shall be 
considered no further here.
Nozick calls upon us to consider the possibility that “ani-
mals have some inherent value and hence may not be treated 
any way anyone might please, but [that] their inherent value is 
not equal to that of people” (1997, 310). (Nozick’s use of people 
is frustrating, as it is unclear whether he is gesturing towards 
a non-speciesist account of differential value between persons 
and non-persons, or towards a speciesist account of differential 
value between humans and non-humans. While the latter might 
be assumed in the context of the review, the former aligns bet-
ter with his wider axiology.) The possibility is raised, then, of 
accepting the close relationship between inherent value and 
moral status posited by Regan, but meanwhile exploring the 
inegalitarian and non-categorical account of inherent value de-
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fended by Nozick. To do this, we must first grasp what this 
account is.
In ASU, Nozick makes axiological appeals, but these are 
ultimately intuitionistic, and no account of value is offered. 
Thus, for example, animals “count for something” (1974, 35). 
When Nozick approaches axiology elsewhere, he conceptual-
izes value as “organic unity”. Entities are valuable insofar as 
they unify disparate elements; all else being equal, x is more 
valuable 1) if it brings elements into a tighter unity, and 2) if the 
elements unified were originally more disparate. An exception 
is made for entities with a destructive telos, in which tighter 
unity/more disparate elements make the entity less valuable. 
What all of this means in practice will depend on the “realm” 
of the entity. Judging the unity/value of artwork requires dif-
ferent tools to judging the unity/value of an ecosystem (Nozick 
1981, 415-9, 440-4; Nozick 2006, 162-6). Indeed, whether 
a concept of telos is appropriate in a given realm may vary: 
the concentration camp has a destructive telos and is thus a 
highly disvaluable unity. The volcano is destructive, but lacks 
a destructive telos, so should be recognized as a valuable unity 
(Hailwood 1996, 154; cf. Nozick 1981, 419).
Regan’s axiology thus lacks the breadth of Nozick’s, hence 
Nozick’s concern that “the preservation of endangered species 
has no special claim” for Regan (1997, 309). Species are, for 
Nozick, valuable unities, and so worth some level of positive 
evaluation. It is not, however, Nozick’s criticism of the nar-
rowness of Regan’s axiology upon which I wish to focus; Re-
gan could simply be offering an axiology for the “realm” of 
animals. Nozick would still challenge Regan’s axiology were 
this the case. When judging the unity of animals – including 
humans – Nozick exalts the same features as Regan, but identi-
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fies a unity (and thus, value) hierarchy, in contrast to Regan’s 
egalitarianism. This hierarchy is based upon the psychological 
features of the beings in question: “Sentience and then con-
sciousness add new possibilities of unification over time and 
at a time, and self-consciousness, being an ‘I’, is an especially 
tight mode of unification” (1981, 416-7; cf. 2006, 163). Thus, 
all else being equal, the sentient are more valuable than the 
non-sentient, the “conscious” are more valuable than the mere-
ly sentient, and the self-conscious are more valuable than the 
merely “conscious”. This is explicit in Nozick’s critique of Re-
gan: the “beliefs, desires, intentions, future orientations, etc., 
[of animals] surely are far more rudimentary than those of most 
humans, and this may make much moral difference” (1997, 
306-7, emphasis mine).
When Nozick applies his axiology, he concludes that “the 
ranking of organisms in accordance with degree of organic 
unity matches our value ranking of them, with people above 
other animals above plants above rocks” (1981, 417). Again, 
Nozick’s use of people is questionable. If mental sophistication 
is the primary means of judging unity in the realm of “ani-
mals,” then he presumably means persons. This would place 
some humans above others on this value hierarchy, and even 
some animals above some humans. In fact, Nozick does not shy 
away from this possibility, noting that there are “distinctions 
in value within” the “categories” of “people,” “animals” and 
“plants,” in addition to “some overlap” between them (1981, 
415). Nozick thus denies the equality of humans (and persons), 
though, in his example of “overlap,” he sidesteps this tricky is-
sue (1981, 415). Nozick declares a redwood more unified than a 
mouse (1981, 415; cf. Hailwood 1996, 150; Milburn 2017, note 
12); if he is right that the redwood has greater unity, the red-
wood’s size, longevity and physical complexity will serve to 
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outweigh the mouse’s relative mental sophistication. (Some-
thing similar could, for Nozick, be true of humans in certain 
cases. The biological complexity, longevity, and physical size 
of particular humans could mean that they are more valuable 
than animals with greater psychological complexity; though 
humans will always be relying on their relatively sophisticat-
ed mental capacities when compared to, say, cetaceans. Thus, 
while some humans are more valuable than most/all cetaceans, 
some humans will be less valuable than some/most/all ceta-
ceans.)
The unpalatability of Nozick’s axiology should now be clear. 
Nozick is able to offer a robust, individualist, non-speciesist 
and non-Reganite axiology through being willing to jettison 
the equality of humans. Some humans, for Nozick, are more 
unified, and are thus more valuable. Indeed, Nozick is not only 
offering a kind of human-person-versus-human-non-person di-
chotomy; presumably, n humans will display n levels of unity, 
and thus each will have a different value. In being willing to 
make this claim, Nozick can offer an alternative axiology to 
Regan, in which most humans are more valuable than any giv-
en animal.
Inegalitarian animal ethics?
It may seem that elucidating upon Nozick’s challenge has 
simply served to defend Regan. If we were to combine Nozick’s 
inegalitarian axiology with Regan’s close positioning of inher-
ent value and moral status, we would develop an account in 
which individuals have radically differing levels of moral sta-
tus; indeed, even among humans, levels of moral status would 
vary. This is a bullet that few of us will be willing to bite. But 
perhaps simply dismissing Nozick here is a mistake. Not only 
is Nozickian axiology able to avoid the putatively problematic 
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“all animals are equal” conclusion of Reganite axiology, but 
it is able to overcome a more fundamental problem faced by 
animal rights approaches.
John Hadley (2015a) claims that animal ethics is faced with 
an inconsistent triad when it comes to questions of value. Ani-
mal ethicists are committed to: 1) the psychology principle, the 
claim that direct moral status is dependent upon psychological 
capacities (e.g., sentience, being subject-of-a-life) rather than 
species membership; 2) the same kind principle, the premise – 
drawing from post-Darwinian metaphysics – that all animals 
(including humans) ought to be considered the same kind; and 
3) the evolutionary principle, which is that genomic plastic-
ity/adaptive variation is the best explanation for evolutionary 
change.
There are, Hadley claims, several problems with the coexis-
tence of these three principles. One of them is that advocates of 
animal rights seem to want to retain the idea of moral status as 
categorical (allowing us to retain our commitment to the moral 
equality of all humans) while also allowing degrees of moral 
status for beings lacking in certain capacities. Indeed, even 
those who putatively maintain a commitment to cross-species 
equality, in practice, “draw sharp lines through the class of psy-
chologically complex animals” (Hadley 2015a, 19). Regan is 
no exception (Hadley 2015a, note 10; cf. Russow 1988); recall 
his (in)famous lifeboat cases. With the introduction of these 
distinctions, the psychology principle is shown to be incompat-
ible with the same kind principle. Meanwhile, the evolutionary 
principle shows that those capacities upon which Regan’s mor-
al status rests “admit of degree above the threshold” at which 
Regan claims inherent value (and thus moral status) is categori-
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cal (Hadley 2015a, 23). There are thus fundamental tensions 
in Regan’s egalitarian and categorical account of moral status.
If Hadley is correct, then it seems that even Reganite philos-
ophy slips into hierarchical thinking about moral status. Per-
haps, then, animal ethicists could entertain the following pos-
sibility: Truly egalitarian axiology closely tied to moral status 
is a pipe-dream, meaning that if we wish to retain close links 
between inherent value and moral status, we need to develop 
an axiology that embraces – however reluctantly – inegalitari-
anism. Where better to start than Nozick, given that he is ap-
pealing to the same features as Regan?
Perhaps this possibility goes too far – to be clear, I present it 
for discussion, not to endorse it. At the very least, we should be 
ready to recognize that radical inegalitarianism offers a solu-
tion to Hadley’s metalevel problem. Interestingly, it is one that 
Hadley dismisses out of hand: “it is fair to say that dropping the 
equality of persons would be too high a price to pay for bring-
ing animal rights theory strictly into line with nature” (2015a, 
25). If Nozick’s axiology is minimally defensible, then perhaps 
Hadley’s dismissal is too quick.
Concluding remarks: Rega(i)ning Nozick’s 
animal ethics
Nozick’s choice to anthologize his review of The Case some 
14 years after its original publication indicates that he saw 
much of value in his critique of Regan. Commentators have 
previously drawn attention to the less compelling arguments 
that Nozick deploys – concerning the mental capacities of ani-
mals and the putative significance of species membership. In 
this paper, however, I have sought to draw attention to two 
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separate lines of critique, both of which are best understood 
relative to Nozick’s wider work. 
First, Nozick criticizes Regan for the political nature of his 
framework, and expresses worries about the kind of welfare 
state that post-Regan thinkers would endorse – and now have 
endorsed. This opens the door to considering the possibility 
of a libertarianized animal rights, and a “Nozicked” Regan. 
Not only is such a possibility less bizarre than it may first 
sound, but it should be of interest to anyone concerned about 
the prospect of “welfare payments for year-old mammals, non-
voting citizenship for them, and interspecies marriage rights” 
(Nozick 1997, 309). Second, Nozick criticizes Regan for his 
radical egalitarianism. This critique is best understood rela-
tive to Nozick’s wider axiology – one that draws upon similar 
resources to Regan’s, but one that reaches very different con-
clusions. A door is opened for a wholly inegalitarian axiology, 
and thus – if Regan’s foundations of rights are retained – an 
inegalitarian account of moral status. While near-unpalatable, 
there may be reasons for us to entertain this possibility.
It has been my intention neither to endorse Nozick’s criti-
cism of Regan wholeheartedly, nor to defend Regan from these 
challenges. My purpose in this paper has been, instead, to 
show that there is much more to Nozick’s critiques than meets 
the eye, and that – if we are willing to explore them, especially 
in conjunction with his wider work – they may have much to 
offer animal ethics, Reganite or otherwise. Nozick is one of the 
most provocative and influential philosophers of the 20th cen-
tury, and devoted several pages in his first and most important 
book to arguing that vegetarianism is morally mandatory. It is 
my belief that Nozick deserves to be thought of as an original 
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and intriguing – if reluctant – animal ethicist, and that his argu-
ments, whether ultimately successful or not, warrant attention.
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